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Can the Feds Deliver Workers’ 
Compensation for Occupational Disease?
Peter S. Barth
University of Connecticut
With only a few exceptions, American workers are protected from 
work-caused injuries and diseases under state—not federal—workers’ 
compensation laws. As a result, it is an oddity to find a specified cat-
egory of private sector workers covered under a federal workers’ com-
pensation program, and solely for one grouping of diseases. Since there 
are strongly held positions on the desirability of having the federal gov-
ernment play a dominant role in compensation for other occupational 
diseases, the track record of such a program can serve as an indicator 
of how successful such a new approach might be. The central focus of 
this chapter is the Black Lung Program, created to compensate workers 
for occupational disease due to coal dust exposure. In this chapter I first 
describe the history and the development of the law, and then give some 
emphasis to the benefits that the program has delivered. I also consider 
the challenges of federalizing a program that had been administered 
previously, solely by the states. I conclude by attempting to lay out 
some lessons that the program has provided us. 
The origins of my interest in this subject can be traced to the early 
1970s. Although the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act that created the 
Black Lung Program was enacted in 1969, it was actually the passage 
of the Occupation Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970 that led me to 
this subject area. Section 27 of the 1970 law created the National Com-
mission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws to evaluate and make 
recommendations on a host of issues related to those laws. While the 
commission’s final report assessed a variety of issues, including those 
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that the OSHA statute expressly mandated, one issue that was barely 
considered was that of compensation for occupational disease. As a re-
sult, I considered that a necessary trail to follow.
The second factor that led in this direction also followed from the 
work of the commission. One of the central themes in the life of the 
commission was the future role, if any, of the federal government in 
workers’ compensation programs. A steady drumbeat of those opposed 
to federal involvement was that the three programs for which the fed-
eral government had responsibility were, at best, no better than the state 
programs. Like so much in this field, it was difficult to separate fact 
from self-interest, conventional wisdom, and rumor. 
I conducted several studies relating to occupational disease that led 
me to conclude that the states were doing an ineffective job of compen-
sating afflicted workers, or their survivors, for most diseases.1 While the 
temptation was strong to suggest that this be left to the federal govern-
ment to remedy, it seemed irresponsible to do so without first examining 
an existing federal program to compensate victims of occupational dis-
ease. The result of that was my examination of the federal Black Lung 
Program, which left me wary of recommending that the state programs 
for occupational disease be scrapped.2 If neither the state programs nor 
the federal Black Lung Program were delivering benefits well to work-
ers with occupational diseases, what other alternatives existed? Several 
things about the tort experience as found in the asbestos debacle or in 
the Federal Employers Liability Act as it applied to railroad employees 
offered little hope that this was the appropriate route to take in place of 
workers’ compensation. In the absence of any more general approaches 
to occupational disease compensation, it may be that the various state 
and federal programs should be reexamined to determine whether the 
more recent experience appears to be more promising.
The Black Lung experience is not the only source of learning on 
federal involvement in occupational disease compensation. A new fed-
eral program for occupational disease compensation recently has been 
created, the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 
Program Act of 2000. As its name indicates, this legislation targets a 
highly specific group of workers. However, it is probably too soon to 
evaluate at this point, particularly since the portion assigned to the De-
partment of Energy (subsection D) has experienced some serious delays 
in its implementation. 
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAW 
On November 20, 1968, an explosion occurred in a large mine 
in Farmington, West Virginia. After an extraordinary amount of me-
dia coverage of the attempt to rescue miners trapped therein, the mine 
was sealed 10 days after the blast, entombing 78 men. This tragedy led 
Congress to pass the Coal Mine Health and Safety legislation, which 
President Nixon signed 13 months later. The law aimed to improve the 
safety conditions in America’s coal mines, and the bulk of the law is 
directed that way. However, at the urging of some powerful members 
of Congress from the coal-producing states, particularly West Virginia 
and Kentucky, a Title IV was inserted to provide “black lung benefits” 
to miners with the disease.
As the statute was initially enacted, it can be separated into three 
distinct portions. First, claims for old cases that met certain criteria 
were to be paid. In some instances, these cases emanated from miners 
or survivors of miners who had stopped working in coal mining many 
years before. These claims were to be paid out of U.S. Treasury funds. 
Secondly, compensation was to be paid for persons who became dis-
abled or died more recently, and where claims were to be filed in the pe-
riod after the old cases had had time to make their claims. These claims 
were to be paid initially by the U.S. government, with their liability to 
be shifted to coal mine operators. Finally, eligibility for benefits under 
the federal law would expire in several years, subject to certification 
by the U.S. Department of Labor that the state programs met specified 
standards, allowing the states to again assume sole responsibility to ad-
minister their workers’ compensation programs. Table 10.1 provides a 
summary of the most significant developments under the law.
The case for a federal black lung benefits program partially rested 
on the argument that the states were not providing compensation ben-
efits to coal miners who suffered from this condition. At the time, there 
was little evidence to demonstrate how frequently states were grant-
ing compensation benefits to miners disabled by respiratory illnesses 
caused by their employment. Supporters of a federal black lung benefits 
program did not differentiate between the states as to those that were 
doing a more conscientious job of providing compensation in a manner 
consistent with their laws. The case for a federal program clearly left 
unresolved a number of questions, including whether the states were 
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Table 10.1  Historic Developments, Black Lung Program
Year Measure Significance
1969 CMHSA enacted.
Part B established in SSA.
Part C established in USDOL.
Creates Black Lung Program.
1972 Law amended. Extends Part B program by 18 months.
Part C program life extended from 
1976 to 1981.
Federally funded benefits under Part C 
to end in 1973.
1977 Law amended and Black Lung 
Revenue Act enacted.
Interim standards imposed on Part C 
program.
Termination of Part C program is 
dropped.
Creates Superfund-like arrangement.
1980 Ronald Reagan elected. New administration.
1981 Black Lung Benefits Act and 
Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act 
of 1981 enacted.
Benefit standards tightened. Coal 
excise tax increased. Insurers escape 
potentially high liabilities.
1985 COBRA enacted. Excise tax increased as a temporary 
measure.
1987 PL100-203. Period of temporary excise tax 
increase extended to 2013.
1988 Pittston Coal Group et al. v. 
Sebben et al. 488 U.S. 105 (1988).
Trust fund and employers dodge 
potentially large liability.
1997 USDOL propounds new 
regulations.
Proposes tighter administration and 
relaxation of some standards.
2000 New regulations promulgated.
NOTE: CMHSA = Coal Mine Health and Safety Act; SSA = Social Security 
Administration; USDOL = U.S. Department of Labor; COBRA = Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.
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enabling workers with other forms of occupational diseases to receive 
compensation benefits. And the case in favor of enactment of Title IV 
was advanced vigorously on the grounds that it would be a very inex-
pensive draw on the federal budget. Advocates for enactment argued 
that it would likely be a relatively inexpensive program for the coal 
mine companies, who found themselves in an industry that was in secu-
lar and very serious decline, particularly in the underground sector.
Title IV largely consisted of two parts. For claims filed on or before 
December 31, 1971, the program, Part B, was to be administered by the 
Social Security Administration (SSA). The goal was straightforward 
enough: benefits, funded by the U.S. Treasury, were to be provided for 
persons who were totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or to depen-
dent survivors of miners who had died from that disease. The hope was 
that in the first two years of the program, all the old cases would be 
compensated, leaving the newly developing cases for Part C of the pro-
gram. The latter was to be the U.S. Department of Labor’s (USDOL’s) 
responsibility beginning in 1973. That agency was to certify that the 
states were meeting certain minimum standards, and that the new cases 
of sickened miners then would be administered by the states. As such, 
the Part B portion of the program would fade out of existence, as benefit 
determinations would cease after the initial two years, and as a result of 
the attrition of beneficiaries through aging and passing on. The expec-
tation was that through attrition, Part C would become superfluous as 
states would administer their workers’ compensation law and accept the 
coverage of mine workers with pneumoconiosis. 
This phasing out of a federal role was linked to a timetable that 
proved to be wholly unrealistic. The hope was that the “old” claims 
would be dealt with under Part B, and that all of those claims would 
have been filed by Dec. 31, 1971. The transition year, 1972, was to have 
claims paid by SSA only until the end of the year and then handed over 
to USDOL. After December 31, 1972, the benefits were to be paid by 
coal mine operators under the USDOL’s Part C program, or through the 
federally certified state workers’ compensation programs. In essence, 
the plan was for those who filed a claim in the transition year to be paid 
after Dec. 31, 1972, in the same manner as were those who filed a claim 
after that date.
For those “new” claims filed in 1972 and later, where benefits were 
not paid under a federally certified state law or by a coal mine operator, 
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federal general revenues were to be used to pay benefits. The expec-
tation by some was that the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act would 
lead to a sharp reduction in the incidence of black lung disease. That 
expectation relied upon the various health and safety provisions that 
were the raison d’être of the 1969 law. The hope was that this would 
enable federal involvement in these cases to cease by the end of 1976, 
aside from simply continuing to pay benefits under the Part B program. 
Indeed, benefit payments made under the Part C program, whether from 
a mine operator or paid by USDOL, would no longer be required after 
that time. Thus, the plan was that the liability of mine operators was to 
be a temporary one, aside from any state law benefits. 
Some critics charged that Part B was not a workers’ compensation 
program because it had characteristics that were different from all the 
state programs. For example, benefits for living miners was paid solely 
for total disability (comparable to Social Security Disability Insurance), 
once benefits began, they were expected to be paid for a lifetime, and 
benefit amounts were not linked to the worker’s earnings. By contrast, 
all workers’ compensation programs in the states (and all other jurisdic-
tions that I know), pay benefits also for partial disability, compensation 
for temporary disability appears to be the cornerstone of all other pro-
grams, and benefits are almost always linked to the worker’s preinjury 
earnings level.
Another feature that seemed to differentiate the federal program 
was that benefits were awarded based on the date that the claim was 
filed, not on the date when total disability or death occurred. Since the 
payments were considered to be workers’ compensation benefits, any 
Social Security disability benefits were offset against the Part B pay-
ments, as were unemployment insurance, state workers’ compensation, 
and temporary disability insurance benefits. Benefit levels were tied to 
the federal employee pay scale so that benefit payments (new and con-
tinuing) were adjusted (upward) annually in line with the federal pay 
schedule.
Upon enactment of the law, claims for benefits from workers or 
survivors poured into local SSA offices. A variety of coal worker orga-
nizations worked at spurring the submission of claims, and since ben-
efits were to begin for successful claimants from the date of filing, any 
delays meant foregone income. In the first year of the program, about 
one-quarter of a million claims were filed. Although 350,000 claims 
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were filed by the end of December 1971, new claims continued to flow 
in at the rate of about 1,500 per week. Clearly, coal mine operators 
could foresee a massive liability awaiting them. Moreover, despite the 
unexpectedly large volume of claims by Dec. 31, 1971, it was also ap-
parent that not all of the “old” cases had been filed; indeed, some were 
for death or disability that had occurred many years previously. SSA 
moved with extraordinary speed on the claims submitted, but much 
to the disappointment of the program’s supporters, about half of the 
claims were denied compensation. These three factors, the potentially 
ruinous outlook for some mine operators, the continuing inflow of old 
cases—many of which were based on employment in the mines that 
ended before 1970—and SSA’s denial rate led those who supported the 
1969 enactment to push to amend the law in 1972. 
The 1972 amendments extended the Part B program for an addi-
tional 18 months. This would enable more of those with “old cases” to 
file claims under the Part B program. The Part C program, which was 
to have ceased at the end of 1976, was to be maintained until Decem-
ber 31, 1981. This gave the states more time to amend their laws and 
change their practices so as to achieve certification by USDOL. It would 
also extend the period for which claims for newly developed illnesses 
or fatalities would be eligible for benefits that would be paid out of 
federal funds. After December 31, 1981, it was envisioned that the pay-
ments under Part C were to end. A new transition period was mandated, 
from July 1, 1973, to December 31, 1974. Under the 1972 amendments, 
claims filed prior to July 1, 1973, that were approved would receive 
lifetime benefits; those filed from July 1, 1973, to December 31, 1973, 
were to receive federally funded benefits till December 31, 1973, and 
then become the responsibility of the mine operators. Any claims filed 
after December 31, 1973, were to be the responsibility of the employ-
ers. 
The hearings that led to the 1972 amendments along with the modi-
fications caused SSA to grasp the message that Congress was convey-
ing and substantially liberalize the standards for compensability. How-
ever, when USDOL was handed the administrative baton on July 1, 
1973, a variety of disasters befell the agency. First, the agency was 
overwhelmed by large numbers of old claims from the transition period 
and from post-July 1. Second, the states did not respond as had been 
forecast with the result that successful state certification never material-
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ized. The states did not enact legislation to enable them to be certified 
by USDOL, absolving the federal government from turning over the 
administration and funding to the states. Additionally, unlike the Part 
B program which used federal funds, USDOL was now responsible for 
identifying responsible payers, a litigious and lengthy process. Indeed, 
in most cases no responsible operator could be identified and made li-
able, so USDOL was the payer of last resort. 
USDOL was not the only party that found the law difficult, and it 
received considerable heat for the way it carried out its responsibilities. 
The law’s most ardent supporters were frustrated with the Labor De-
partment as well, eventually resulting in amending the law again, this 
time in 1977. For a number of reasons, delays of several years in adjudi-
cating claims meant that applicants were not learning of the resolution 
of their claims. Worse, for the law’s advocates, fewer than 8 percent of 
claims were approved for benefits where a decision had been rendered. 
By the time of the 1977 amendments to the law, about 125,000 claims 
had been filed with USDOL, 6,000 received awards, and 70,000 claims 
were denied.3 In sharp contrast, to that date SSA had achieved an ap-
proval rate of 70 percent. The difference was that the standards USDOL 
used for compensability were based on the agency’s best efforts at com-
pliance with a statute that was vague at best. 
The 1977 amendments enabled USDOL to set its own medical stan-
dards for determining compensability. Until those standards were final-
ized, however, temporary standards were to be used and here the amend-
ments imposed very strict guidance. The labor department’s interim 
standards were to be no more restrictive than the ones used by SSA un-
der the Part B program after the 1972 amendments (which achieved the 
nearly 80 percent acceptance rate). In addition to lowering the standards 
for finding the presence of the disease, evidentiary requirements on the 
claimants were reduced, the notion of total disability was broadened, 
and the occupational qualifications were expanded. Previously denied 
claims were to be reviewed once again for entitlement by USDOL, as 
were previously denied Part B claims, and claimants could provide new 
evidence if they chose to do so.
In addition to greatly expanding the opportunity to obtain benefits, 
the termination date for the Part C program was dropped, essentially 
making the program a permanent one. Further, Congress needed to fix 
the financing problem that had resulted from the huge inflow of claims 
Revisiting Black Lung   261
under Part C, along with USDOL’s inability to successfully assess li-
ability against private coal companies in so many of the successful 
claims. The result was a separate piece of legislation, the Black Lung 
Revenue Act of 1977, which took a Superfund-like approach to financ-
ing benefits.4 A tonnage tax was levied on coal extracting companies 
to support a federal trust fund that would pay benefits in one of three 
instances. First, for a compensable claim where a responsible operator 
could not be identified, the fund would pay the appropriate benefits. 
Second, the fund would pay if the successful claimant had last worked 
in the mines prior to January 1, 1970. Finally, the fund would pay ben-
efits in cases where a responsible operator did not begin to make pay-
ments in a timely manner, though the fund would then seek reimburse-
ment from the business. 
Despite the issuance and application of the more liberal, interim 
rules, many claims were denied. While USDOL promulgated its interim 
rules in a manner that it believed was no more strict than those it was 
obliged not to exceed, this led to court challenges by claimants denied 
benefits under the interim rules. A critical issue was one of the presump-
tions in USDOL rules that could be invoked by a claimant if the worker 
had at least 10 years of employment in coal mining. Four separate U.S. 
Circuit Courts found the requirement that there must be at least 10 years 
of employment before the presumption in the claimant’s favor could 
be invoked to be unacceptably restrictive, and ordered that USDOL re-
open over 94,000 cases. Had these cases been found to be successful, 
the costs could have exceeded $13 billion, imposing a burden both on 
the trust fund and on employers and their insurers. Strikingly, the Su-
preme Court found that the application of this key presumption had 
been more restrictive than the interim standards were to allow, but that 
the 94,000 cases would not have to be reopened.5 Instead, the decision 
required reconsideration only of the small number of denied applica-
tions (6,000–7,000 claims) that had sought a judicial review at the time 
of the denial. 
Three things led to another major turning point in the program in 
1980–1981. First, USDOL issued the new regulations for the program, 
no longer tied to the liberal standards of the interim rules. Second, a new 
administration was elected in 1980. It was evident that it would not con-
tinue the more inclusive type of program that had evolved under both 
the SSA standards and the interim ones that USDOL employed after the 
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1977 amendments. Third, by 1981 many claims had been determined 
to be compensable. The new administration sought to tighten standards 
under the law. The law’s most ardent supporters could consider that 
their war had been won and that few older miners with respiratory ill-
nesses (or survivors) had not received compensation. In 1981, the laws 
were amended by enactment of the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act 
of 1981 and the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981. The result 
was legislation that emerged from compromises between the law’s de-
fenders and those who believed that it had been overly generous in the 
awarding of benefits. Reflecting this compromise, while some standards 
for benefit eligibility were toughened, claims that had been filed before 
the effective date were to be evaluated under the criteria that were in 
place previously. 
The new amendments also made accommodations to most of the 
interested parties, including the insurance industry, which was relieved 
of having to pay benefits for some of about 10,000 cases that would 
now become the responsibility of the trust fund. At the time the 1981 
amendments were passed, the trust fund was already indebted to the 
U.S. Treasury by over $1.5 billion. To remedy that, the amendments in-
creased the excise tax on the coal extraction industry. The tax was again 
increased (as a temporary, 10-year measure) in 1985 in the Consoli-
dated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, which also placed a 
5-year moratorium on the interest charges due to the Treasury. In 1987, 
PL 100-203 extended the temporary tax rates that had been set in 1985 
through 2013. 
In 1997, USDOL announced changes that it sought to make in its 
regulations. One of the goals was to improve the efficiency of claims 
adjudication. Another aim was to reduce some of the difficulty that 
some applicants faced in having their claims found to be compensable. 
The final regulations were announced in December 2000 and then were 
subjected to serious challenge in the court. Widely varying estimates 
were made about the impact of the changes on employer and trust fund 
costs and on the incidence of successful claiming that would be ex-
pected to occur. 
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BENEFITS AND BENEFICIARIES
Compensation for benefits under the federal program varies only 
with the presence of and number, if any, of dependents. As of 2003, the 
compensation of a primary beneficiary was $534 per month, or $801 per 
month for a primary beneficiary and one dependent. (The amounts are 
the same in the Part B and Part C programs.) The maximum monthly 
benefit was $1,069 for a primary beneficiary and three dependents. Fed-
eral black lung benefits are considerably lower than those payable in 
state workers’ compensation programs, though the state claims appear 
to be more difficult to win. A sample of state workers’ compensation 
benefits is shown here for illustrative purposes, drawing on those states 
that have had the largest number of federal claimants. The following 
were the maximum weekly benefits under state workers’ compensation 






West Virginia   $527
The state benefits rates assume total disability, and unlike the fed-
eral benefits, are not payable for a lifetime, typically. Moreover, the 
monthly federal benefit rates are adjusted annually to reflect changes in 
average price levels. Medical benefits for treatment of the compensable 
condition are paid fully, theoretically, in each system. 
USDOL is not able to provide a single estimate of the number of 
successful miner claimants over the life of the program. It can report, 
however, the number of beneficiaries with “active claims” in a year. 
Active claims (under Part C) include any of the following: those being 
paid from the trust fund or by responsible mine operators, cases in in-
terim pay status, those where offsets are taken and those that have been 
suspended temporarily. In terms of the number of beneficiaries, both 
primary and total (where total includes both primary and dependent 
beneficiaries), the program is rapidly receding. Table 10.2 shows that 
the Part C program has contracted from its high point in 1983, when 
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over 64,000 miners were receiving benefits.6 Not surprisingly, the Part 
B program has had a very substantial decline in the number of its ben-
eficiaries, particularly miners, as can be seen in Table 10.3. The data 
demonstrate how much the Part B benefits provided financial support to 
an older miner population, many of whom had stopped working before 
the law was enacted. SSA estimates that 97 percent of the miners and 
widows were age 65 and over in 2001.
One of the more contentious issues over the life of the program has 
been its utilization. When the law was first proposed, and in its early 
years, the numbers of potential (successful) applicants for benefits were 
greatly underestimated. In 1970, the first full year of the program, coal 
mining employed only 132,000 workers. While that number had been 
declining for several decades, 15 years earlier, only 169,000 persons 
were employed in coal mining. (Clearly, a number of those employed in 
1955 were also employed in 1970.) About 350,000 claims (some from 
survivors) were filed within the first two years of the Part B program. It 
appears that more (former) miners were drawing Part B benefits in 1974 
Table 10.2  Black Lung Beneficiaries, Part C Program, Selective Years
1980 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
Miners 52,922 64,181 54,920 40,866 27,340 14,733
Widows 26,739 35,178 41,607 44,103 41,585 32,615
Totala 139,073 166,043 150,123 123,213 94,488 61,162
a Total includes all primary and dependent beneficiaries and excludes medical-benefit-
only claims.
SOURCE: Unpublished and published annual reports, USDOL. 
Table 10.3  Black Lung Beneficiaries, Part B Program, Selective Years
1974 1979 1985 1990 1995 2001
Miners 169,097 129,558 77,836 45,643 24,573 9,779
Widows 134,700 146,527 138,328 118,705 91,517 55,412
Totala 487,216 419,948 294,846 210,678 143,011 79,518
a Total includes all primary and dependent beneficiaries.
SOURCE: SSA (2002). 
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than were employed in the mines at the time or within any recent years. 
It is evident that a very large proportion of persons who ever worked in 
coal mining applied for and in many cases received benefits from either 
the Part B or the Part C programs. While this attests to the liberality of 
the compensability standards of the law, at least during its first decade, 
it also suggests that respiratory illness in coal miners was widespread.
Table 10.4 shows the results of Part C claims decided in fiscal year 
2001, the most recent year for which these data are available from the 
Labor Department. While almost 4,300 Part C claims were decided that 
year, only 363 (8.3 percent) were approved that year. Clearly, the level 
of activity in terms of new claims has slowed down substantially from 
earlier years. It seems likely that the most recent changes in regulations 
will lead to a higher rate of claim acceptances, and this in turn may 
generate some increase in claiming.
TRUST FUND EXPENSES
Though the volume of new claims decisions and acceptances is 
small relative to previous years, the program’s continuing expenses are 
not trivial. As shown in Table 10.5, expenditures by the trust fund for 
the Part C program in fiscal year 2001 were approximately $1 billion, 
Table 10.4  Part C Claims, Adjudication, Initial Level, FY 2001a
Findings Number decided Approval rate (%)
Trust fund approved 80 9.6







Total approved 363 8.3
Total denied 4,026
Total findings 4,389
a Includes reconsidered claims.
SOURCE: USDOL (2001).
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including the interest charges to the fund for current and previous bor-
rowing from the Treasury Department. Strikingly, though the number 
of recipients has been declining over the previous 10 years, obligations 
have increased, albeit slowly. The reason for this is that despite the de-
cline (in nominal dollars) in expenditures for indemnity and medical 
benefits, the increase in interest charges has more than offset this. Since 
tax revenue from coal mining was about one-half of that amount, the 
fund needed to borrow another $500 million in FY 2001. The result is 
that the fund is indebted to the Treasury by about $7.3 billion. Note that 
this does not include payments made during the year by mine operators 
under the Part C program for new and continuing beneficiaries. Expen-
ditures for the Part B program in 2001 continued to decline, falling to 
$470 million for the year (SSA 2002). Note also the relatively small 
proportion of total benefits that went for medical benefits. It reflects 
several things, including the limited ability to treat such respiratory 
conditions, and the absence of certain costly medical procedures that 
other illnesses and injuries would require. 
Table 10.5  Black Lung Benefits Program Obligations, FY 2001, 







Coal tax revenues 522,200
Repayable advances from the Treasury Department 505,000
Cumulative trust fund debt 7,253,557
SOURCE: USDOL (2001). 
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SOME LESSONS IN RETROSPECT FROM THE BLACK LUNG 
EXPERIENCE
What lessons can be drawn from the experience of a program that is 
almost 35 years old? The issue may be more than one of academic in-
terest. The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Pro-
gram Act (EEOICPA) is a new federal, occupational disease program. It 
may not be the last time that the federal government seeks to replace or 
augment portions of the states’ workers’ compensation laws.
Breadth versus Depth in Benefits
The Black Lung Program is a prototype of those transfer payment 
programs where government opts for extremely broad coverage (in this 
instance with respect to the nature of the health condition), but very 
modest amounts for beneficiaries. Though state workers’ compensa-
tion programs can scarcely be characterized as generous in their ben-
efits, they appear to be absolutely munificent compared to the federal 
standard.7 Any new transfer payment program may face some trade-off 
between coverage and benefit adequacy that is the result of implicit 
budget constraints. At the birth of this program, its supporters under-
stated the potential number of benefits applicants. Once the legislation 
was enacted, a widespread effort to generate applications began, and 
the numbers of applicants—and eventually beneficiaries—swelled. Yet 
despite the changes enacted during the program, little effort was made 
by program advocates to increase the basic level of benefit.
Problems with Multiple Agency Delivery
The Black Lung Program can be analyzed as two distinct ones. 
Though the Part B (SSA) and Part C (USDOL) components of the law 
were quite clearly delineated, they both were responsible for providing 
benefits for black lung disease to coal mine workers or their survivors. 
As a result, for several years the standards for compensability were 
markedly different in the two agencies. This created enormous prob-
lems for those responsible for the less liberally administered program, 
in seeking to mollify those who were denied benefits. Thereafter, the 
more liberal standards applied by one agency were essentially imposed 
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on the other, only to change again. The observation that multiple agen-
cy administration was problematic is hardly one that required over 30 
years of program experience. However, it may have been lost on those 
who created the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 
Program Act of 2000. A few years into the life of that program, a vari-
ety of groups called for the Department of Energy to relinquish its role 
under Part D and transfer the administration of that portion of the law to 
the Department of Labor. Recall also that in 1997 the administration of 
the Part B program was transferred from SSA to USDOL.
State Workers’ Compensation Programs Still Have Difficulty with 
Coal Workers’ Pneumoconiosis
The original plan for this law was to turn it over to the states after 
the federal government certified the adequacy of the state laws. That 
proved to be one of the many missteps taken by the law. For all pur-
poses, the states did not rush in to do so as had been forecast. The result 
is that USDOL is still responsible for determining both compensability 
and liability under the law. There does not appear to be any statutory 
bar on a worker’s successfully winning compensation in the state sys-
tems. And since benefit levels tend to be higher in the state programs, 
one would expect that most applicants would seek benefits there. Data 
are lacking on the numbers of workers who have successfully gained 
benefits in the states, but there are reasons to believe that gaining them 
is difficult. First, the number of workers with federally derived benefits 
who are also obtaining state benefits appears to be minuscule. USDOL 
has reported that only 4 percent of the total cohort of Black Lung Pro-
gram beneficiaries have an offset of their federal awards. Additionally, 
USDOL provides SSA with a listing of Part C beneficiaries in order to 
apply the SSDI offset.8 The annual amount of the offset savings to SSA 
was less than $400,000. Data from the states reinforces the view that 
the states are not paying many new black lung claims. In at least one 
state, Kentucky, the law was tightened in 1996, and although it appears 
to have been liberalized in 2002, for all purposes, virtually no new ben-
eficiaries are being compensated. Until 1996, Kentucky may have been 
the most liberal of the states with regard to compensating this disease.
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Defining the Disease
Historically, many jurisdictions worldwide and in the various states 
have “scheduled” diseases that would be compensable in their systems. 
By defining the conditions that would be compensable, at least under 
certain conditions, these laws reduced the difficulty in administer-
ing them. The Coal Mine Health and Safety Act followed that model, 
though it did so inadequately. Prior to its enactment in 1969, there was 
no disease known as black lung. (History now has it that this was a leg-
islatively created disease.) The law’s supporters and their representa-
tives led the miners to expect federal compensation for any respiratory 
ailment. Clearly, that magnified the potential scope of coverage and in-
cluded a wide range of medical conditions. Certainly, the proponents 
of the law aimed to cover as broad a range of conditions as they could. 
Those who sought to limit the range of compensable conditions defined 
the disease as disabling or even “complicated” coal workers’ pneumo-
coniosis. Those who administered the law had to determine its intent 
in the absence of a well-defined, legislative-targeted disease condition. 
The various measures to amend the law and to force SSA and USDOL 
to review claims that had been denied were a product of this differ-
ence in perception about the coverage of the law. The issue continues 
to characterize the program. Two weeks before the close of the Clinton 
administration, USDOL promulgated final rules to revise its regulations 
of the law. (The original proposed rules changes were put forward in 
1997.) Among other changes, the regulations expanded the definition 
of the disease. 
The “Desk Book” of the administrative law judges points out that 
the disease is both medical and legal, with the former being “merely a 
small subset of the afflictions compensable under the Act.”9 It contin-
ues, “a medical diagnosis of no pneumoconiosis is not equivalent to a 
legal finding of no pneumoconiosis.”10 
Presumptions Carry Both Advantages and Disadvantages
The statute and the regulations for Black Lung Program benefits in-
clude a number of presumptions. Presumptions are placed into laws as 
a way to ease or shift the burden of proof in a claim for benefits. There 
are several reasons why the use of presumptions can be helpful to all 
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parties in adjudicating workers’ compensation claims for nontraumatic 
conditions. The major virtue of using them is that it eliminates the need 
to litigate the same (or broadly similar) issues repeatedly. As a result, 
outcomes are more predictable, and they can be derived more expedi-
tiously and with lower transaction costs. For example, expert witnesses 
need not be used repeatedly in disputes over the same set of questions. 
Large numbers of claims can be moved through the adjudication process 
more rapidly in the presence of presumptions. Additionally, they reduce 
the likelihood that “individual justice” will result in opposite outcomes 
in cases with the same or similar fact conditions. The party to whom 
the burden of proof has been shifted can overcome rebuttable presump-
tions. Irrebuttable presumptions cannot be overcome and, therefore, af-
fect more than the matter of who bears the burden of proof. 
The use of presumptions for occupational disease is more com-
monly found in other jurisdictions than in the U.S. states, where indi-
vidual justice seems to be the norm and where litigation and attorney 
representation are not unusual. The major downside with the use of 
presumptions is that they can be used as a device to manipulate the ease 
or difficulty in receiving compensation. Perhaps this is simply to note 
the obvious, i.e., presumptions that are consistent with the overall intent 
of the law, that are in line with medical science, and that bring greater 
equity are to be preferred to those that do not. 
 The Black Lung Law, originally and in amendments and in regula-
tions, made extensive use of presumptions. As an example, the 1969 
statute established that “if a miner who is suffering or suffered from 
pneumoconiosis was employed for 10 years or more in one or more coal 
mines there shall be a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis 
arose out of such employment.”11 Since the worker still had to prove 
that there had been 10 years’ employment in coal mines and that he had 
pneumoconiosis, those burdens of proof remained with the claimant. 
However, if the worker was able to establish those arguments, it became 
the defense’s burden to prove that the illness arose out of any other 
employment or nonemployment exposure. And if the worker could not 
show that 10 years had been worked in coal mining, it did not prevent 
the worker from seeking to establish that his condition arose out of his 
exposure in coal mining. Clearly, that would have made it more difficult 
to win compensation benefits. Perhaps this is simply to note the very 
obvious, that is, presumptions that are consistent with the overall intent 
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of the law, that are in line with medical science, and that bring greater 
equity are to be preferred to those that do not. 
As much as anything else, presumptions were used to raise or lower 
rates of successful filing under the law, and they remain most suscepti-
ble to being used to loosen or tighten eligibility, regardless of the scien-
tific merits. Congress, in particular, was responsible for this continuing 
effort to tweak the standards, at least for the first dozen years of the law. 
However, we can find a similar type of manipulation that has occurred 
in the states. Kentucky has witnessed a number of law changes that 
aimed to raise or lower the success rate in the filing of state black lung 
claims. In 1996, eligibility under the law was tightened in response to a 
concern about the cost of such claims. In 2002, the law was liberalized 
because the 1996 amendments were found to be excessively restric-
tive. The 2002 amendments have been reported to still leave virtually 
no claimants eligible for benefits and consideration is being given to 
loosening the standards further. As was the case in the federal arena, the 
standard does not appear to be motivated by science and medicine as it 
is for the number or the rate of successful claim filing.
Inconsistent Offsets of Benefits
This entire chapter could be written around the issue of offsets under 
the law. Suffice it to say that there have been a host of complications, 
indicating that a simple generalization of the treatment of the issue is 
not possible. Over time, the law regarding offsets has been changed 
several times. The Part B program operates with different rules than 
does Part C. Further, offsets have and have not been applied to earnings 
(for the totally disabled miners but not for widows), or depending upon 
the date that a claim was filed, to SSDI, and to state workers’ compen-
sation benefits (for respiratory diseases and/or for occupational injuries 
or illnesses). As an example of a further complication, at least one state 
(Pennsylvania) paid benefits to miners with dust diseases out of gen-
eral revenues, raising the issue of whether or not this was a (offsetable) 
workers’ compensation benefit.12 It is difficult to establish how well the 
offsets are monitored, though they are likely most carefully monitored 
where a mine operator or insurer would be able to reduce payments due 
to the presence of multiple income sources. USDOL provides SSA with 
information on Part C beneficiaries on a monthly basis, and SSA reports 
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that it offsets less than $400,000 a month from its SSDI payments. As 
noted earlier, fewer than 4 percent of Part C beneficiaries are affected 
by the offset taken by USDOL for the payment of state workers’ com-
pensation benefits. The “offset story” reveals how difficult it can be to 
overlay a federal program onto an existing state program, made more 
complex by an attempt to legislate different criteria for conditions aris-
ing in previous years (Part B-SSA) and for current and future ones (Part 
C-USDOL). 
The Challenge of Finding Responsible Operators
About one in five approved claims become the responsibility of the 
trust fund. Unlike the earliest years of the program, when some miners 
had not worked for several years, there is less of a catch-up now, and 
less reason for the mine operator to have disappeared from the scene. 
There is little doubt that USDOL is aiming to have successful claimants 
become the responsibility of the employers or their insurers, and not 
that of the already indebted trust fund. Here are simply two kinds of 
problems that emerge when the responsible operator approach is used. 
Consider a claim where a miner submits a successful claim for ben-
efits. Suppose that subsequently, the mine operator who was initially 
liable for benefits is shown to be not responsible and another operator is 
then identified as “responsible.” The timing is likely to be such that no 
defense of the claim by the subsequently identified operator is practi-
cally possible. (The courts have held that once a claimant is successful 
in claiming a benefit, USDOL cannot assess liability against a newly 
named mine operator.)13 That would lead to a potential liability of the 
trust fund. To prevent that, USDOL might name several employers as a 
“potentially liable operator.” That can result in multiple defenses being 
prepared to defeat the claim, including the need for multiple, duplicative 
medical examinations. Or consider the requirement that mine operators 
are required to be insured for federal black lung claims. (Approval for 
self-insurance is permitted under the law.) But not all responsible op-
erators are coal mine operators—the law provides considerable latitude 
over coverage, occupationally. Thus, some employers may be found to 
be “responsible operators,” yet uninsured for federal benefits, though 
they are in compliance with respect to coverage under state workers’ 
compensation laws. 
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Can a Federal Workers’ Compensation Program Be Shut Down?
Although some people argue that a federal government program is 
not likely ever to shut down, the Black Lung Program appears headed 
in that direction. Clearly, the Part B portion has experienced a huge 
decline in numbers of beneficiaries, and the Part C section is far smaller 
today than it has been. Moreover, there is no evidence that all the states 
have stepped up efforts to find and compensate victims of coal workers’ 
pneumoconiosis. Some may argue that 31 years after the enactment of 
the Black Lung provisions, the federal government has decided that it 
is prepared to tackle another situation where it appeared that the states 
were not compensating victims of occupational disease. Again, the law 
creates separate, though less parallel responsibilities for two agencies in 
the EEOICPA of 2000. Again, it has picked a specific group of workers, 
and identified certain diseases to receive special treatment and benefits. 
As was the case with black lung, supporters of the EEOICPA of 2000 
argued that state workers’ compensation laws had not been providing 
justifiable benefits to a specific group of workers. And as was the case 
with black lung three decades ago, it has not taken long for bipartisan 
criticisms of the administration of the law to emerge, requiring amend-
ments because of a lack of movement on benefits being delivered to 
workers or survivors.14 
Notes
 1.  In particular, see Barth and Hunt (1980).
 2.  Barth (1987). Sources for some of the history that follows can be found in this 
study.
 3.  The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 (PL 95-239) was actually signed 
into law on March 1, 1978.
 4.  PL95-227 was signed into law early in 1978.
 5.  Pittston Coal Group et al. v. Sebben et al. 488 U.S. 105 (1988).
 6.  The highest year for the number of all beneficiaries was 1982, but the high point 
for the number of miners receiving Part C benefits was 1983.
 7.  The basic, no dependent benefit was set at 50 percent of the entitlement due to 
a totally disabled federal employee at the GS-2, step 1 level, under the Federal 
Employees’ Compensation Act.
 8.  Offsets are discussed later in the chapter. Such provisions exist in laws to limit 
the degree to which recipients might receive benefits from multiple sources. Off-
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sets can have several aims including limiting payer costs and limiting excessive 
benefit amounts.
 9.  USDOL, Office of Administrative Law Judges, “Judges Benchbook of the Black 
Lung Benefits Act, August 2001,” Chap. 16, Sec III a (1). Also, see Richardson 
v. Director, OWCP, 94 F. 3d 164 (1996).
 10.  From Hobbs v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 45 F.3d 819 (4th Cir. 1995).
 11.  Section 411 (c)(1).
 12.  Director v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 54 F. 3d 141 (1995).
 13.  Director, OWCP v. Trace Fork Coal Co., 67 F. 3d 503 (1995).
 14.  See Congressional Record–Senate, June 16, 2004, pp. 6837–6847, and S. 2400 
June 7, 2004, Amendments to Title XXXVI of the Floyd D. Spence National 
Defense Authorization Act for FY 2001 (Bunning Amendments).
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